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The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate critically the ongoing reform of the High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Center (ISC) concept.  
Prior to 9/11th, 2001, the national intelligence apparatus was littered with flaws, including 
lack of information sharing, interagency conflict, and autonomous operations.  The 
HIDTA Intelligence Support Center in New Mexico was no exception.   Post 9/11th, 
2001, many national agencies realized that in order to address successfully the increasing 
threat of terror, several changes needed to be made in the intelligence system at all levels.  
Similarly, the HIDTA Investigative Support Center has reacted to the post 9/11 
environment by more strictly enforcing its framework for information-sharing and 
instituting a series of changes in its institutional processes.  This process of reform has 
yielded positive results for the New Mexico HIDTA ISC.  The ISC has now transformed 
into the centerpiece of information exchange and interagency cooperation among HIDTA 
members.  The ISC is also acting as a conduit or “Fusion Center” for information sharing 
between agencies investigating crimes relating to drug trafficking, terrorism, and money 
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A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate critically the ongoing reform of the High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Center (ISC) concept.  
Prior to 9/11, the national intelligence apparatus was littered with flaws, including lack of 
information sharing, interagency conflict, and autonomous operations.  The HIDTA 
intelligence framework was no exception.   Post 9/11, many national agencies realized 
that in order to address successfully the changing threat of terror, several changes needed 
to be made in the intelligence system at all levels.  Similarly, the HIDTA Investigative 
Support Center has reacted to the post 9/11 environment by more strictly enforcing its 
framework for information-sharing and instituting a series of changes in its institutional 
processes.  This thesis seeks to determine if the changes within the HIDTA Investigative 
Support Centers, post 9/11, are having the desired effect of transforming the ISC into a 
centerpiece of increased information exchange and interagency cooperation among 
HIDTA members and a conduit for information sharing with agencies investigating 
crimes related to drug trafficking, like terrorism and money laundering. 
B. IMPORTANCE   
Evaluating HIDTA reform is important because it allows us to understand 
whether the capability of the HIDTA intelligence apparatus to provide actionable 
intelligence at the strategic and tactical levels to local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agents, has improved post 9/11.  By commingling agents and centralizing resources, 
HIDTA initiatives appear to have made the concept of “inter-agency” information 
exchange their centerpiece.  Given the importance of intelligence sharing in the post 9/11 
environment, an evaluation of the level of success of HIDTA reform requires 
examination.  
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT   
The thesis answers the question of whether the reforms to the HIDTA 
Investigative Support Centers facilitated information exchange and interagency 
cooperation post 9/11. It answers this overarching question by addressing a series of 
specific questions:  What is the purpose of the HIDTA Investigative Support Centers and 
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to what extent did the centers fulfill their purpose prior to 9/11?  What factors contributed 
to the successes and failures of the centers, in particular, how do the interests that 
participating agencies bring to the table and the rules HIDTA sets for their participation 
affect the HIDTA ISC operation? Do HIDTA reforms effectively address the factors that 
have undermined HIDTA intelligence operations in the past and provide the new 
intelligence sharing capabilities required in the post 9/11 environment?    
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
The thesis relies upon a review of official HIDTA documents and interviews of 
key HIDTA participants, such as, Executive Directors, Deputy Directors, and supervisory 
intelligence analysts, to answer my research questions.  In total 6 interviews were 
conducted.  I will focus in particular on the functioning of, and reforms within, the New 
Mexico HIDTA, using a “political economy” framework.  
1. Why New Mexico is Important as a Case Study      
The New Mexico HIDTA was chosen as a case study because the large number of 
federal, state, and local agencies involved in its operation makes information sharing 
particularly important and challenging.  In addition, New Mexico typifies the drugs-terror 
threat on the border that has been the focus of energies since 9/11, and which requires 
enhanced information sharing among agencies.  The challenges of interagency 
coordination manifested themselves within the New Mexico HIDTA pre 9/11, gained 
renewed urgency in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and were addressed in post 9/11 
intelligence reconstruction.  For these reasons the New Mexico HIDTA warrants a closer 
look. 
  A large number of agencies work along the New Mexico border to control the 
drug-terror threat posed by the porous border with Mexico.  New Mexico is the fifth 
largest state in land area, has over 1.8 million residents, and shares more than 180 miles 
of international border with Mexico.  According to New Mexico High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area statistics, the following volumes of traffic crossed the U.S.-Mexican 
border, at three designated Points of Entry (P.O.E.) in New Mexico (Santa Teresa, 
Columbus, and Antelope Wells). 
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Type of Crossing 2001 2002 
Pedestrian Crossings At P.O.E.’s: 18,581,600 26,416,500 
Truck Crossings At P.O.E.’s: 3,418,600 3,260,600 
Car Crossings At P.O.E.’s: 57,400,700 76,534,000 
Bus Crossings At P.O.E.’s: 46,600 94,700 
Total: 79,447,500 106,305,800  
 
Table 1. Volume of Traffic Crossing the U.S/Mexican Point of Entries1 
 
Those who enter the U.S. from Mexico should proceed through these formal 
points of entry for inspection.  It is widely known that smugglers and drug trafficking 
organizations make every attempt to circumvent the P.O.E.’s in order to distribute their 
loads.  “The total of illegal immigrants, which includes smugglers, is not exactly known 
but the United States Border Patrol estimates that between 60,000 to 80,000 illegal aliens 
safely entered New Mexico.”2    
The implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has 
dramatically increased the volume of cross-border traffic at P.O.E’s along the New 
Mexican-Mexican border.  “From 1999 to 2000 the United States Customs Service 
reported a 30 percent increase in the number of commercial vehicles at the Santa Teresa 
P.O.E.”3  As the statistics indicate, there is an indisputably large population of legitimate 
and illegitimate traffic crossing the border from Mexico into New Mexico. 
In spite of the many successful seizures by law enforcement, several thousand 
pounds of undetected illegal narcotics, several thousand illegal immigrants, and an 
                                                 
1 FY 2004 New Mexico High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Threat Assessment 
2 Ibid. 10.  
3 Ibid. 2.  
4 
unknown amount of contraband make it across the border.  This raises the question of the 
possible connection between drug trafficking organizations and terrorists.  Connections 
between terrorist groups and drug smugglers concern the United States not only because 
drug cartels often fund terrorist groups but also because their smuggling techniques might 
be used to sneak weapons of mass destruction into the country. 
Because of the existing threat on the southwest border and the cascading effects it 
has throughout the nation and the State of New Mexico, the HIDTA has enlisted over 63 
different agencies to form a common framework of interagency cooperation.  The 
HIDTA consists of the following agencies:   
Federal: Amtrak Police Department, Department of Defense JTF-6, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, United States Marshal Service, Internal Revenue Service, United 
States Attorney's Office, United States Border Patrol, and United States Customs Service.  
State: New Mexico Department of Corrections and Parole, New Mexico 
Department of Public Safety, New Mexico National Guard, and District Attorney's 
Offices of the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Districts.  
County/Municipal: Albuquerque Police Department, Alamogordo Department of 
Public Safety, Artesia Police Department, Aztec Police Department, Belen Police 
Department, Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department, Bernalillo Police Department, 
Bloomfield Police Department, Carlsbad Police Department, Corrales Police Department, 
Deming Police Department, Dona Ana County Sheriff's Department, Eddy County 
Sheriff's Department, Espanola Police Department, Eunice Police Department, 
Farmington Police Department, Grant County Sheriff's Department, Hatch Police 
Department, Hidalgo County Sheriff's Department, Hobbs Police Department, Jal Police 
Department, Las Cruces Police Department, Lea County Sheriff's Department, Los 
Alamos Police Department, Los Lunas Police Department, Lovington Police Department, 
Luna County Sheriff's Department, Otero County Sheriff's Department, Questa Police 
Department, Rio Arriba County Sheriff's Department, Rio Rancho Police Department, 
Sandoval County Sheriff's Department, San Juan County Sheriff's Department, Santa Fe 
County Sheriff's Department, Santa Fe Police Department, Silver City Police 
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Department, Sunland Park Police Department, Taos Police Department, Taos Police 
Department, Tatum Police Department, Torrance County Sheriff's Department, 
University of New Mexico Police Department, and Valencia County Sheriff's 
Department.   
Because of the increased threat and high volume of agencies participating within 
the HIDTA, there is a need for a hub of intelligence, event and case deconfliction, and 
database connectivity.  This is what the New Mexico Investigative Support Center (ISC) 
has been designed to do.   The HIDTA ISC is the intelligence centerpiece of law 
enforcement agencies within the State of New Mexico. The New Mexico ISC provides 
for the collection and commingling of vital Federal, State and Local law enforcement 
personnel and databases that are available to assist in counterdrug and anti-terror 
investigations and interdiction. The New Mexico ISC provides event and case 
deconfliction for officer safety and enhanced intelligence; strategic intelligence for 
refined targeting and officer resource allocation; and operational analytical support for 
ongoing initiative-driven case activity through access to criminal and commercial 
databases.4     
The New Mexico HIDTA’s structure is recognized as a force multiplier.  Federal, 
state, and local law enforcement benefit from the additional resources, training, and 
intelligence that the HIDTA ISC provides.  In the end, the threat of narcotics, the threat 
of illegal immigrants, and the threat of illegal contraband are true concerns for US 
national security.  The New Mexico HIDTA, in essence, has provided additional 
infrastructure to combat these critical threats.  As a result, the New Mexico HIDTA is a 
relevant organization to study and its existence on the southwestern border merits 
academic review. 
2. Political Economy Framework 
This framework focuses on how the interests of the key actors involved in the 
HIDTA intelligence process, as well as the institutional setting within which the actors 
interact, affects their incentives to share information. The political economy framework is 
classified into three broad paradigms:  rational choice, institutional process, and symbolic 
                                                 
4 http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Director%20Chavez%20_witness_.pdf.  Accessed 15 August 
2004. 
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response.5  This examination will only look at rational choice and institutional process as 
contributing factors for information and intelligence sharing post 9/11.   
The rational choice analysis of information sharing is to assume that the behavior 
of actors in the system (at what ever level of analysis one adopts) is determined by 
rational choice.  “This means actors have stable preferences or interests, consider the 
alternative choices available to them, predicts the consequences or their choices, evaluate 
likely outcomes in terms of their interests, and choose the strategy with the highest 
expected value”.6   Simply stated, individuals seek the highest possible payoff through 
the use of a prudent decision making process.   
The rational choice paradigm also attempts to explain how individual choices will 
aggregate into collective action.  Rarely are outcomes dictated by any one actor.  Rather, 
they are the consequence of choices jointly made by two or more players in a game.7 
This approach has been applied to the behavior of individuals in groups and 
organizations, to contests among interest groups, to bureaucratic behavior, to legislatures, 
and now to information and intelligence sharing.  
Institutional process is a second approach to the study of information and 
intelligence sharing.  The basic premise held in this approach is that the behavior of 
actors is determined by preexisting institutions.  This concept attempts to explain how 
rules, norms, routines, and other institutions limit options for actions and at least partially 
predetermine their selection, thus channeling behavior along established paths.8  In short, 
this process attempt to explain how internal regulations, internal norms, and internal 
routines will guide or dictate decisions that are desirable to further the goals or objectives 
of the entity in question.  This approach, and that of rational choice, will be applied to the 
New Mexico HIDTA case study. 
 
                                                 
5 Mayer, Fredrick.  Interpreting NAFTA:  The Science and the Art of Political Analysis.  A 
Framework for Political Analysis. P. 4. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. P. 5.  
8 Ibid.  
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E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY   
Chapter II explores the functioning of the New Mexico HIDTA ISC in the 1990s.  
It begins with a description of when and why the HIDTA intelligence centers were 
created, the agencies that participate in the centers, and to what end their activities were 
intended to contribute (e.g., tactical, investigative, or strategic intelligence).   The chapter 
shows that although HIDTA ISC’s were created to overcome jurisdictional boundaries 
and increase information sharing, they failed to accomplish these goals.    
     A political economy framework that examines actor interests and institutional 
settings is used to explain why the HIDTA ISC failed to work properly prior to 9/11. 
Actor’s interests are based on preferences, alternatives, consequences, and pay offs.  
Within the HIDTA ISC, distinct cultural divisions, jurisdictional battles, and the desire to 
maintain autonomous operations prevented member agencies from providing information 
to the ISC or utilizing it as a primary resource.  In addition, although the institutional 
framework was in theory adequate to promote information sharing, HIDTA leaders failed 
to enforce the rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures that would have 
created incentives for information sharing.   
Chapter III describes how the HIDTA has changed and how it has began to 
operate in the post 9/11 environment. Two very important changes have occurred in the 
post 9/11 environment.  First, the interests of actors have changed and now agents and 
administrators at all levels understand that in spite of organizational and procedural 
differences, information sharing is paramount.  Second, institutional processes (rules and 
regulations) are now being enforced and sanctions are being levied to ensure information 
exchange is occurring at all levels. Interviews and qualitative findings show that the ISC 
is finally the centerpiece of the HIDTA organizational structure that it was originally 
intended to be.  In addition, the HIDTA ISC will begin collecting and disseminating 
information on terrorist activity and on money laundering in an attempt to “fuse” larger 
amounts of information into intelligence for law enforcement agencies. 
Chapter IV presents conclusions and policy recommendations.  This chapter will 
summarize the impact of reforms on HIDTA operations and make recommendations on 
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continued improvement.  HIDTA leadership should continue enforcing regulations since 
this has led to an improvement in information sharing.  Policy recommendations include, 
HIDTA supervision must maintain strict adherence to information sharing rules, 
regulations, and policies.  Strict adherence to these policies guides the actors within the 
HIDTA to make prudent decisions that foster information sharing between agencies.  
Also, leadership must control the divisive cultural and organizational behaviors that exist 
between agencies.  Solving these immediate problems will free HIDTA leadership to 
focus on data base connectivity and HIDTA interoperability within the law enforcement 
community.  Finally, the research indicated that the HIDTA ISC is understaffed based on 
the threat that it faces and the increasingly central role ISC is playing in HIDTA 
operations.  In the past this understaffing has contributed to the marginalization of the 
ISC.  HIDTA leaders must find the means to increase ISC staffing levels to prevent a 
recurrence of this problem.   
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II. ROLE OF THE HIDTA INTELLIGENCE CENTERS PRE 9/11 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter describes the creation of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers (ISC), in the early 1990’s, as one of the federal 
government’s key efforts to increase the level of interagency cooperation in the war on 
drugs.  It then describes how the HIDTA intelligence apparatus failed to fulfill its 
information-sharing role in the 1990s.  Next, the chapter offers an explanation of why the 
HIDTA information sharing system malfunctioned pre 9/11. A political economy 
framework is used to understand how the interests of the member agencies participating 
within the HIDTA and the institutional rules and procedures governing their interaction 
undermined information sharing.  In particular, the different jurisdictions, agency 
missions, cultures and protocols for protecting information of Federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agents created barriers to information sharing.  In addition, the ISC 
leadership’s failure to enforce existing rules and procedures and to create a robust 
intelligence capacity within the ISC meant that member agencies had few incentives to 
share information. 
B. ROLE OF THE HIDTA ISC 
At the height of the drug war in 1986, President Ronald Regan signed a National 
Security Decision Directive that called drug trafficking a “threat to the national security” 
of the United States and directed all federal agencies with a role in drug enforcement to 
pursue counter narcotics efforts more actively.  As a result of the Executive’s declaration 
of war on the American drug epidemic, other governmental bodies began to address the 
drug problem in the form of policy changes and even in legislation.  The United States 
Congress is one of the key governmental bodies that began to restructure the American 
government to defend against the war on drugs.  
      Congress authorized and funded a national drug control office.  The Office of 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was created.  Congress also felt that there was a 
need to focus resources on the areas where drugs were entering the nation and created the 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program in response.  The program was created by 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and first funded in 1990, when federal funds were 
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appropriated to five areas of the United States that were considered the most critical high 
intensity drug trafficking area “gateways” for drugs entering the nation.  The five regions 
included specific designated counties in Los Angeles, CA, Houston, TX, New York/ New 
Jersey, South Florida, and the Southwest Border. By 2004, there were 26 HIDTA-
designated regions.  
The HIDTA mission is to coordinate the efforts of local, state, and federal drug 
law enforcement agencies at the level of both operations and intelligence.  Examples of 
operational initiatives are the, “U.S. Marshals leading task forces focused on fugitives, 
U.S. Customs Service leading initiatives focusing on drug profits, and Marine interdiction 
task forces lead by the U.S. Coast Guard.”9  Examples of intelligence roles are, gathering 
and analyzing information from seizure reports, open source data, and general drug 
intelligence reports and providing this intelligence to investigative and interdiction task 
forces.   
As the HIDTA framework was in the developmental stages, ONDCP directed that 
an essential element, in the form of a viable intelligence apparatus be included into each 
HIDTA.  As a result, the HIDTA ISC was created to fulfill several key investigative and 
intelligence roles within the HIDTA structure.  The HIDTA structure is set up so that the 
intelligence “brain” of the apparatus can directly and safely apply the “muscle” of 
enforcement in the appropriate place at the right time.  This type of action is commonly 
referred to as intelligence driven operations.  With interagency coordination as the 
backbone of the HIDTA mission, information exchange – the responsibility of the 
Investigative Support Center (ISC) -- has quickly become the centerpiece of the HIDTA 
nationwide.  
The ISC mission, as dictated by ONDCP, is as follows, “To provide accurate, 
detailed, and timely tactical, investigative, and strategic intelligence to HIDTA-supported 
task forces, in an effort to provide more effective and efficient utilization of drug 
investigative resources.”10 The ISC “collocate[s] and commingle[s] participants from 
                                                 
9 Design For A HIDTA/OCDETF Performance Monitoring and Management System.  Office of 
National Drug Control Policy. January 2003. p. 11. 
10 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.  Section IX of the 
HIDTA Program Policy & Budget Guidance Manual. p. 2. 
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federal, state, and local agencies, who interact on a daily basis and have on-site access to 
the agencies intelligence databases.”11  By collocating and commingling law enforcement 
agents from the D.E.A., F.B.I., State Police, and Metropolitan complexes in one building, 
lines of communication are created and agencies that may not have otherwise 
communicated are now working and communicating together on a daily basis.   
Moreover, the collocation of agencies in the HIDTA ISC is intended to create 
partnerships that, “Balance power between law enforcement leaders which ensures the 
integration and synchronization of efforts to reduce drug trafficking, eliminate 
unnecessary duplication of effort, maximize resources, and improve intelligence and 
information sharing both within and between agencies.”12  According to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration,  
The HIDTA Investigative Support Center creates a system that empowers 
agencies to synchronize their efforts.  In addition to providing additional 
equipment and technology, the program enables drug control agencies to 
pioneer new ways of collaboration.  The agencies communicate more 
rapidly and effectively and actively share intelligence resources, such as, 
manpower and equipment.  As partnerships mature, personnel from 
different agencies hand off cases to each other and conduct cross-case 
analysis.  By working together, agencies develop a common vision and 
collective problem solving techniques.13 
A federal law enforcement presence within the HIDTA ISC translates information 
into useful strategic intelligence on major drug trafficking organizations, money 
launderers, and narco-terrorist organizations.  Intelligence is then passed to the field 
operators, other agencies, and, if necessary, to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 
where it is vetted at a strategic intelligence clearinghouse.  Federal agents then develop 
cases and courses of action based on the intelligence gained from the HIDTA ISC or 
from EPIC.  Federal presence is mandatory within the ISC.14   
State and local law enforcement rely on the HIDTA ISC for tactical and/or 
investigative intelligence.  ISC personnel receive raw data in the form of seizure reports 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/overview.html.  High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
(HIDTA): Overview.  p. 3.  Accessed 18 MAR 04. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA FBI Supervisor.  Steve Hale.  20 APR 2004. 
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and incident reports, this data is then piecemealed into trend data for law enforcement 
officers to plan and execute tactical level operations.  State and local law enforcement 
officers are the ambassadors to the community and their presence has a visible and direct 
impact on the local communities they represent.  ISC intelligence allows local 
enforcement task forces to focus on the local communities and conduct operations that 
have immediate impacts on their local neighborhoods. 
New Mexico HIDTA analysts support 16 ongoing New Mexico HIDTA 
investigation, interdiction, and prosecution initiatives. Analytical staff and leadership 
must ensure that the expected outputs of the New Mexico ISC Initiatives contribute to the 
realization of the nine core information sharing performance measures described in 
Section 9.03 of the ONDCP program policy.  These performance measures are: 
Performance Measure # 1 Event Deconfliction 
Performance Measure # 2 Case Subject Deconfliction 
Performance Measure # 3 Post Seizure Analysis 
Performance Measure # 4 Analytical Case Support 
Performance Measure # 5 Strategic Intelligence 
Performance Measure # 6 Connectivity to Other Databases 
Performance Measure # 7 Drug Threat Assessments 
Performance Measure # 8 Reports of Drug Seizures by Agencies to 
the National Drug Seizure System at EPIC 
When Developed 
Performance Measure # 9 Photo-Imaging Network Capability  
Table 2. Nine Core Information Sharing Performance Measures Prescribed by ONDCP15 
 
The nine core goals of information sharing establish tangible objectives that guide 
the New Mexico ISC efforts in the arena of information exchange and intelligence 
                                                 
15 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.  Section IX of the 
HIDTA Program Policy & Budget Guidance Manual. p. 2. 
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sharing.  The use of database technology, analytical case support, and firmly rooted 
information sharing policy are the foundation of the ISC support to the field.  In the 
1990’s, these mechanisms were in place yet they yielded little results.  The core 
information sharing goals were undermined by inter-agency conflict and a leadership that 
failed to emphasize their importance.        
      
C. FUNCTIONING OF THE HIDTA INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT CENTERS 
IN THE 1990S 
Views of information sharing, pre 9/11, largely reflected the attitudes of law 
enforcement nationwide.  In order to test law enforcements willingness to share 
information a 1990 Operation Alliance Joint Command Group conducted a survey of 
information sharing within the southwest border region.  A feasibility study was  
conducted to determine what intelligence exchange and management might be supported 
by member agencies in the Southwest border states.  “The survey found that of those 
surveyed 90 percent indicated a willingness to integrate data from all concerned agencies 
into a single source for the South West Border.  ‘Disturbingly’, however, while 81 
percent of the respondents indicated they would want access to the data of other agencies, 
only 67 percent would allow access to their data . . . it became clear that almost all 
respondents would only allow indirect access to their data”.16  The findings indicate that 
the logic of law enforcement was imperfect when it came to sharing information.  The 
“receive and not give” mentality was the single defining characteristic of law 
enforcement at all levels.  This defining characteristic is what contributed to the HIDTAs 
information-sharing nightmare.   
An excerpt from the Operation Alliance meeting summarizes the state of 
intelligence sharing pre 9/11 very well, 
Respondents were not satisfied with the present situation, characterizing 
information/intelligence exchange as being “hit or miss,” with actual 
“intelligence business” being conducted by personal contact and 
investigator meetings-in short on a case by case basis.  They cited “limited 
                                                 
16 J.F. Holden-Rhodes.  Sharing the Secrets:  Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs.  
Praeger Publishers.  Westport, CT.  1997. p. 90.  
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connectivity between existing and planned networks” and “limited 
integration of federal efforts with those of state and local.17  
The Operation Alliance survey highlights the mindset of law enforcement 
nationwide and the results can be directly applied to the New Mexico HIDTA ISC.  
Agencies were not sharing information and the information they did share was “hit or 
miss”.  There was no incentive to connect initiatives within the HIDTA.  Furthermore, 
there were no incentives to connect to external organizations outside of the HIDTA to 
enhance information sharing.  As a result, individual actors opted not to share with other 
agencies and rationalized that withholding information was the right thing to do. Pre 
9/11, connectivity and interoperability, nationally and within the New Mexico HIDTA 
ISC, was bleak at best. 
Prior to 9/11, the New Mexico HIDTA ISC was not adhering to its adopted 
ONDCP mission statement or the nine core performance criteria.  According to a New 
Mexico HIDTA supervisor, the mission of the New Mexico HIDTA ISC was as 
worthless as the paper it was printed on.18  On paper there was an established mission, on 
site there was a building labeled the ISC, and there were analysts and supervisors 
gainfully employed; yet the ISC was rarely being used as an information sharing or 
intelligence producing resource.   
HIDTA intelligence operations, prior to 9/11, were characterized as several law 
enforcement agencies working in the same building but to an extent not working together.  
Most, if not all, HIDTA entities were working autonomously, engaged in jurisdictional 
battles, investigating the same criminal organizations or individuals, and hoarding 
potentially critical information.  This problem permeated HIDTA ISC’s nationwide.  
Evidence of this systemic problem surfaced in national conferences conducted by 
ONDCP while trying to reconstruct the ISC post 9/11.19   Interagency conflict and the 
threat it presented to information sharing were topics of interest by working groups as 
they attempted to find and fix problems that hampered information sharing HITDA wide.  
One of the problems identified was making assumptions that by placing federal, state, 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Interview.  Un-named New Mexico HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
19 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  15 December 2003. 
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and local agents in one building that information sharing would become automatic.  This 
was not the case, nationally, and more specifically within the New Mexico HIDTA ISC.   
To the contrary, relations between federal agents, on the one hand, and state and local 
agents, on the other, were characterized my mutual recrimination.  Pre 9/11 state and 
local agents accused federal agents of hoarding information and failing to share 
information on a regular basis.  Federal agents dismissed this accusation only to shift the 
blame to state and local agencies for their lack of information security and habitual 
tendency to leak information to the media.  
Autonomous operations also characterized the HIDTA in the pre 9/11 era.  The 
ISC should have worked to deconflict and coordinate operations and investigations.  Its 
failure to do so could have serious consequences.   For example, three different New 
Mexico HIDTA cooperating agencies were simultaneously investigating the same 
Mexican drug trafficking organization.  At face value, this was not a problem.  But the 
problem emerged when each agency attempted to proceed with law enforcement action 
only to find that their duplication of effort and lack of information sharing critically 
hampered the case in the adjudication process.20   A local agency charged the defendant 
with a misdemeanor crime and the federal agency charged the defendant with a felony 
crime.  As a result, the defense attorney moved to have the felony dismissed and had the 
defendant plea to the misdemeanor offense.  If the HIDTA cooperative agencies would 
have joined forces and preceded in a unified effort, then a more efficient investigation 
could have been conducted while ensuring that the strength of the case would not have 
been jeopardized.  The HIDTA ISC could have facilitated coordination with an alert, an 
intelligence report, or even a simple email to notify these agencies that they were 
investigating the same case.  
To illustrate further the seriousness of autonomous actions without ISC event 
deconfliction, reference will be made to a “Blue on Blue” incident that occurred on the 
Arizona/Mexican border at the Coronado National Monument in July of 2002. Two 
federal law enforcement agencies were conducting nighttime, counter-narcotic 
operations, in an area that experiences high levels of smuggling, without knowing that the 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
16 
other agency was operating in the same area of operation.  As each agency progressed 
with its mission, they unknowingly encroached upon one another.  As a result, US 
Customs agents encountered US Border Patrol agents and drew their weapons on them 
believing that they were involved in an illegal smuggling operation.  In the end, no 
rounds were fired and no one was hurt but the incident has been described by several law 
enforcement officials, as one of the most serious interagency coordination blunders that 
has occurred on the southwestern border.21    
In these cases (and others), consultation and coordination could prevent agencies 
from working at cross-purposes. It would also allow affected agencies to make plans to 
deal with the unintended consequences of the drug control efforts of others.22  At any 
given time, as many as ten different law enforcement agencies (i.e. US Border Patrol, US 
Customs, National Guard, JTF-6) operate in the same area of operation along the border.  
Considering the likelihood of possible surprise contact incidents between “friendly” 
agencies, all operations should be coordinated through a central intelligence center.23 The 
HIDTA ISC was designed to deconflict operations occurring simultaneously and in the 
same vicinity as one another.  Unfortunately, in the case above and generally during the 
1990’s, it can be argued that critical information was not communicated, events were not 
coordinated, and cooperation between agencies was not occurring.   
Another very serious challenge to information sharing was the fact that the ISC 
data base infrastructure was not being utilized and moreover not being improved upon. 
Pre 9/11, the New Mexico ISC was designed to provide HIDTA task forces with 
operational analytical support for ongoing initiative case activity through access to 
criminal and commercial databases.  These databases were to assist with event and case 
deconfliction for officer safety, enhanced intelligence, and intelligence for refined 
targeting and officer resource allocation.24 Unfortunately, a stagnate information sharing 
                                                 
21 Luoma, Benjamin.  “Blue on Blue” Coordination Failures.  Counter drug website.  
Https://www.counter-drug.net/course/admin/course_forum_message_view.cfm?message_id=92.    
Accessed 09 September 04.   
22 https://www.counterdrug.net/course/studies.cfm?course_id=5&cci=mechanisms 
coordination&content_page=16.  Accessed 03 January 2004. 
23 https://www.counter-drug.net/course/admin/course_forum_message_view.cfm?message_id=92.  
Accessed 09 September 04. 
24 http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/nmex-content.html. Accessed 17 September 2004. 
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environment, from the top down, hampered the establishment of protocols to allow 
appropriate on site terminal access to the primary databases of all HIDTA law 
enforcement agencies.  It was stated that pre 9/11 data base access was futile.  The ISC 
data base infrastructure was arthritic.25  Interoperability and connectivity of HIDTA 
databases was a national objective, yet the New Mexico HIDTA was having problems 
just having its own agents utilize the system.  The New Mexico HIDTA did not possess 
significant internet access and did not possess secure or encrypted email services, which 
further lead to communication problems.  The system was not recognized as viable and 
by default agents and agencies utilized organic resources to get the job done.  For 
example, the F.B.I. only sampled information within the F.B.I. database, the D.E.A. only 
sampled from the D.E.A. criminal database, and state and local agencies only sampled 
from department criminal databases.  As initiatives strayed away from the ISC’s database 
infrastructure, they not only put themselves in danger regarding “Blue on Blue” 
incursions but also fostered lack of information sharing and duplication of effort by 
working at cross purposes.  
The New Mexico ISC was also poorly connected to data base nodes throughout 
the national HIDTA organization and national information sharing systems.  This 
problem limited New Mexico ISC communication with agencies in surrounding states 
and regions.  In spite of this shortcoming, efforts to connect to other databases and to 
other information sharing nodes failed to occur.      
Limited security clearances and lack of “trusted agents” security clearances added 
to the problem of information exchange.  Pre 9/11 state and local agents were denied 
access to information because their security clearances were not sufficient.  Federal 
agents are granted secret clearances upon receipt of their federal commission.  It is not 
unusual for agents to be granted top-secret clearances based on agency needs.  As a 
result, agents are relatively unrestricted in the amount of information they can exchange 
between federal agencies and key players within those agencies.  State and local agencies 
are at a serious disadvantage because officers do not receive clearances commensurate to 
their federal counterparts.  State and local agencies have the ability to receive higher-
                                                 
25 Interview.  Un-named NM HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
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level clearances but they are costly and are pursued less frequently.  This created a 
vicious cycle of failed information sharing: federal agencies did not share information 
with state and local players because of limited clearance levels and identifying “trusted 
agents” was difficult because a minority of state and local agents possess clearances 
above secret.  These are problems that undermined information sharing within the 
HIDTA ISC pre 9/11  
HIDTA operations in the 1990’s were problematic to say the least.  ONDCP goals 
were not being met, HIDTA internal goals were not being met, and most importantly the 
mission of information exchange and intelligence sharing was ineffective.  HIDTA 
officials reported that only an estimated 60 percent of HIDTA participants were utilizing 
existing database infrastructure to share information.26  This is an abysmal estimate that 
reflected the plight of information sharing within the HIDTA.  Why did member agencies 
refuse to share information?  Why did the HIDTA leadership tolerate these behaviors?  
The political economy framework will be used as a theoretical guide in an attempt to 
answer these questions.  Focus will be placed specifically on the interests of individual 
actors and the institutional process that led to the malfunctioning status of the New 
Mexico HIDTA ISC.        
D. WHY THE ISC MALFUNCTIONED: ACTORS’ INTERESTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FAILINGS 
In order to understand why the ISC failed to operate properly prior to 9/11, it is 
necessary to examine both the interests of the main actors involved in the ISC and the 
institutional rules that shaped their interaction.  Rational Choice analysis, or the 
assessment of the individual interests, assumes that “actors have stable preferences or 
interests, consider the alternative choices available to them, predict the consequences or 
their choices, evaluate likely outcomes in terms of their interests, and choose the strategy 
with the highest expected value.”27  In the case of the ISC, competing identities put 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies at odds with one another.  As a result 
of agency differences, individual actors possessed different interests, which lead to 
different preferences and ultimately different decision-making processes. 
                                                 
26 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  15 December 2003. 
27 Mayer, Fredrick.  Interpreting NAFTA:  The Science and the Art of Political Analysis.  A 
Framework for Political Analysis. P. 4. 
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As a result, individual interests and agendas created a divisive environment that 
severely hampered information exchange. The fractures in the HIDTA organization were 
based on agency norms and loyalties.28  Shortcomings based on the interests of 
individual actors flawed the HIDTA intelligence structure and negatively affected the 
“interagency” information sharing process.  
In addition, this section examines how the internal regulations, norms, and 
routines of the ISC shape the decisions of actors to share or withhold information from 
the ISC and to utilize the center’s services.  Pre 9/11, the HIDTA institution was 
developed but operations in accordance with the established institutional processes had 
gone awry.  The HIDTA leadership was not enforcing rules that fostered information 
sharing and they were failing to provide incentives or impose sanctions on initiatives that 
were failing to share information.  The following sections will speak specifically about 
the misgivings of actor’s interests and the derelict mismanagement of institutional 
processes pre 9/11.     
1. Actor’s Interests 
Historically, federal agents have focused specifically on higher-level cases.  
Working national and international level cases is common ground for federal agents.  
Cases of this nature require agents to think strategically and more often than not, above 
and beyond, the tactical level.  Federal agents pursue criminal organizations that pose a 
significant threat to national assets and critical infrastructure, the national economy, and 
established freedoms.  US Customs, D.E.A., and the F.B.I. placed great emphasis on the 
national and international narcotic struggles on the Southwest border.  These 
organizational goals channeled their behaviors away from state and local issues and more 
toward US-Mexican border issues.  In addition, federal agents preferred to cultivate 
informants and build cases against the leadership of major drug-trafficking organizations 
-- a process that could take months or even years – rather than making immediate arrests. 
Information security management concerns (discussed above) further defined the 
interests of the federal agents nationally and within the HIDTA ISC.  These interests led 
to stratification within the ISC and ultimately to the faulty information sharing system.   
                                                 
28 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  07 September 2004. 
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State and local agents within the ISC also had unique preferences that contributed 
to the divide in information sharing.  Local agents were not quite as willing to patiently 
cultivate a case when an arrest could be made and an immediate impact in a community 
could be effected.  State and local agents viewed the federal agents as ineffective because 
they would not choose to take immediate action on blatant criminal violations.  This 
typifies the “tactical mentality”.  As a result, state and local agents withdrew from 
interaction with the federal agencies because of the differences in organizational goals.  
State and local agents also viewed the federal agents as secretive and unwilling to pass 
information to the street agents.  This caused state and local interest to shift from looking 
toward the federal agents for information to seeking information from one another.  Once 
again this resulted in division between the HIDTA participants.   
The most prominent problems that plagued the HIDTA organization were divisive 
cultural issues, jurisdictional disconnects, and pursuit of individual agency goals. For 
example, state and local agents viewed the federal agents as secretive and unwilling to 
pass information to the street agents, while federal agents viewed state and local 
operators as threats to information security and large-scale operations. These competing 
identities put federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies at odds with one another.  
Another problem identified is that in spite of having the same overarching goal of 
fighting drug trafficking, federal and state agencies had different missions.  Federal 
agencies spend 99 percent of their time working strategic issues that require lengthy 
investigation and are time consuming, while state and local officials spend 99 percent of 
the time focused on tactical solutions to affect immediate results within their local 
communities. For example, federal agencies work tirelessly to track and identify the 
highest players in an organization.  This process is lengthy and time consuming.  The 
conflict arises when state and local agents make immediate arrests as opposed to 
cultivating a source for high-level exploitation.   Federal agencies view their method as a 
long-term solution for society and state and local agencies view their method as the 
immediate and highly visible benefit to their communities.  These different agendas 
impeded information sharing.  This is a confusing phenomenon because naturally one 
thinks that law enforcement agencies are all on the same side.  They are the “good guys” 
trying to fight drugs and put the bad guys in jail.  Since they have the same goals, one 
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would think they would cooperate and yet they don’t.  Why is that? A closer look into 
each agency will provide more insight into the pre 9/11 organizational behaviors of the 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.   
It was stated that pre 9/11, no one was sharing information, especially the federal 
agents.  They hoarded information so they could receive credit for large-scale 
interdictions and positive media for their agencies.29   This was a common perception 
within the New Mexico ISC.  A state agent was quoted as saying, “the feds expected 
information to be pushed up to them but they never produced a deliverable back to the 
state or local agencies”.30  This frustrated information sharing and caused tension 
between the co-located agencies.  An August 2003 report by the Governmental 
Accounting Office (GAO) on information sharing among Homeland Security agencies 
further illustrates this information-sharing problem within the federal ranks.  The GAO 
report surveyed law enforcement agents at all levels on the timeliness, accuracy, and 
relevance of federal information sharing.  The results are below: 
 
 Timely Accurate  Relevant 
# % # % # % Federal 
Sharing with 
* * * * * * 
Federal 
(n=16) 
6 38 5 31 7 44 
State 
(n=40) 
15 38 19 48 20 50 
Large Cities 
(n=106) 
24 23 41 39 42 40 
Small Cities 
(n=122) 
17 14 26 21 27 22 
Table 3. Information Sharing from the Federal Government: Timely, Accurate, or Relevant31 
                                                 
29 Interview.  Un-named New Mexico HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
30 Ibid. 
31 GAO Report.  Homeland Security:  Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 
Strengthened.  August 2003.  p. 21. 
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Table 3 highlights that city agencies in general, and particularly those in small 
cities, felt that federal agencies failed to share timely, accurate, or relevant information.    
State and other federal agencies have a somewhat more positive view of the information-
sharing practices of federal agencies, but they still report remarkably unsatisfactory 
practices (e.g., only 38 percent reported information sharing on a timely basis).32 
The GAO formally published the following summary based on the reports 
finding: 
Our survey results confirm the perception that the information that 
respondents do receive is not often seen as timely, accurate, or relevant.  
And, of the three aspects, respondents reported that timeliness was more 
of a problem than accuracy or relevancy.  This supports a common 
complaint we heard from police chiefs – that they wanted timely 
information but would often receive information from national news 
sources at the same time that the public received it.  This lack of 
timeliness was often attributed to the federal government’s historic 
reluctance to share information with local law enforcement officials.33 
The GAO’s findings illustrate the dilemma that the HIDTA ISC was faced with in 
the pre 9/11 environment.  When the federal agents did pass on information it was more 
often then not viewed as lacking accuracy, lacking timeliness, and lacking relevance.  
What exacerbated the problem even greater was the fact that the ISC was not being 
utilized.  The ISC was in place to speed up information exchange with the, value added 
bonus, of screening out information that was not accurate or reliable. Individual 
preferences led the federal agents to purposely withhold information.  
Federal agencies have historically held on to information because they felt it was 
safer in their hands.  State and local agencies continually complained that information 
was not getting back to them.  Federal agents protected their interests and their actions 
were to withhold information for a variety of reason.  Referring to the GAO report on 
information sharing, several barriers have been identified that prevent federal agencies 
form providing other agencies with information.  The results are as follows: 
                                                 
32 Ibid. p. 23. 
33 Ibid. p. 22 
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Table 4. Perceived Barrier Preventing Federal Agencies for Sharing Information34 
As shown in table 4, federal officials cited several barriers that they perceive 
prevent them from sharing information.  The two most frequently cited reasons are lack 
of clearances among state and local officials and lack of integrated databases (see 
discussion above).  In addition, federal agents were concerned with state and local 
officials ability to keep sources and methods confidential and possible legal barriers to 
information sharing.  Legally, federal agencies were bound to withhold information that 
was of national interest or of a classified nature.  State and local agencies did not have a 
need to know.  The federal agents, strictly, withheld sensitive information.  
Unfortunately, they also strictly withheld most information.  Federal agencies stern 
adherence to legal information sharing guidelines permeated into general information 
exchange and created an insurmountable barrier for HIDTA participants in fulfilling their 
information/intelligence needs.  These barriers stalled information sharing within the 
HIDTA ISC. 
Each of these barriers has been specifically cited as contributing to the failure of 
the HIDTA ISC in the pre 9/11 environment.  State and local agencies are trained and 
competent and the federal agencies did not recognize this.  As a result, the federal agents 
                                                 







Federal to Cities 
Legal Barriers 13 13 25 
Lack of interest 6 0 0 
Cultural 6 0 0 
Jeopardize ongoing missions 13 13 0 
Lack of confidence to limit disclosure 6 19 6 
Lack of confidence in management 6 0 0 
Concerns with disclosing sources and methods 6 25 19 
Lack of integrated databases  38 38 31 
Lack of Clearances NA 44 50 
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rationally chose to withhold information, and based on their actions the HIDTA ISC 
faltered.   Another example of the stratification between law enforcement agencies was 
noted in the December 2002 report of the Gilmore Commission.  It stated, “the prevailing 
view continues to be that the federal government likes to receive information but is 
reluctant to share information with other partners.  Furthermore, the commission stated 
that the federal government must do a better job of designating “trusted agents” at the 
state and local levels and in the private sector, and move forward with clearing those 
trusted agents.”35  The GAO’s findings mirror what the Gilmore Commission states, 
The perceived barriers were seen to exist by only a few respondents and 
could be overcome.  For example, state and local police routinely handle 
and protect law enforcement sensitive information to support ongoing 
criminal investigations, which suggests that with proper training and 
equipment officials of these governments could handle other types of 
sensitive information as well.36 
In order to create a more accurate picture state and local challenges to information 
sharing must also be exposed.  The 2003 GAO report also highlights how federal agents 
perceived the timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of state and local agencies. 
 
 
Table 5. Information Sharing from City Government:  Timely, Accurate, or Relevant37 
 
 
                                                 
35  Ibid. p. 26. 
36 Ibid. p. 27. 
37 Ibid. p. 25. 
 Timeliness Accurate Relevant 
Cities Sharing with # % # % # % 
Federal (n=16) 2 13 2 13 1 6 
State (n=40) 14 35 17 43 10 25 
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Table 6. Information Sharing from the State Government: Timely, Accurate, or Relevant38 
 
These charts indicate that federal agencies have a much more negative view of 
information sharing than state and local agencies.  Few of the federal agencies that 
responded viewed the state or local information as timely, accurate, or relevant.  When 
the results of the GAO survey are cross-walked and compared to the New Mexico ISC, it 
illustrates the point that federal agents were isolating the rest of the HIDTA participants 
and further perpetuating the faulty mindset in regard to information exchange. These 
tables quantitatively reemphasize, the point that there was an information sharing divide 
between the federal and state and local agencies.   
In sum, the federal agencies created bad feelings throughout the HIDTA 
organization because they simply wanted to withhold information because they didn’t 
feel others were capable of handling, storing, and maintaining operational security with 
law enforcement sensitive data. Their efforts to hold on to such information were for 
valid reasons.  Yet they never made attempts to train state and local law enforcement 
agents in the handling of sensitive material.  Nor did they attempt to grant appropriate 
security clearances to subordinate agencies.  As a result, other agencies chose to pull 
further away from the formal HIDTA body and they in turn began to act autonomously.  
As a result, individual actors began to act in their own best interest.  In the end, this 
behavior virtually dismantled the HIDTA intelligence apparatus. Unfortunately, the 
motivations of each agency hampered the ability of the HIDTA to share information. 
                                                 
38 Ibid. p. 24. 
 Timeliness Accurate Relevant 
State Sharing 
with 
# % # % # % 
Federal (n-16) 2 13 1 6 1 6 
Large Cities 
(n=106) 
32 30 36 30 36 30 
Small Cities 
(n=122) 
21 17 36 30 36 30 
26 
2. Institutional Processes      
The other dimension of the New Mexico HIDTA information-sharing problem 
was created by what can be described as lackadaisical and derelict mismanagement of not 
only HIDTA resources but also the HIDTA ISC.  The most prominent and detrimental 
institutional process that affected the HIDTA ISC, pre 9/11, was simply not enforcing 
established rules, regulations, and policy.  Unfortunately, management did not see fit to 
enforce the policies and procedures on the subordinate initiatives.  It was stated that pre 
9/11 information exchange was not a priority and not emphasized as a critical 
undertaking.39  As a result, there was no incentive or even any sanction concerning 
information exchange. The institutional processes compromised the integrity of the 
HIDTA with the qualities of a substandard, weak, and inefficient information sharing 
system.  
ONDCP guidance mandates that all HIDTA activity must be coordinated through 
the ISC.  It states specifically, 
HIDTA enforcement initiatives must coordinate their activities with the 
intelligence subsystem.  Identification of all drug criminal targets should 
be coordinated through the intelligence subsystem to facilitate cross-case 
analysis, prevent duplication, and ensure the Executive Board, where 
appropriate, has sufficient information to establish priorities.40  
By design, the ISC was to be the centerpiece or hub of HIDTA operations.  Pre 
9/11 this guidance was no different, yet it was not enforced with any vigor.  ISC queries 
were estimated be as low 60 percent across all initiatives.41  According to HIDTA policy 
all initiatives should report and query the ISC 100 percent of the time on all events and 
activities that each initiative has undertaken.  This is a rudimentary way of ensuring 
information was at the very least being viewed but ideally being transferred between and 
among initiatives.  Individual initiatives were failing in their obligation to report and 
retrieve information from the HIDTA ISC.     Because many of the HIDTA agencies were 
acting on their own volition and failing to coordinate efforts with the ISC, they were in 
                                                 
39 Interview.  Un-named New Mexico HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
40 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.  Section IX of the 
HIDTA Program Policy & Budget Guidance Manual. p. 4. 
41  Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  14 September 2004. 
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direct non-compliance with ONDCP rules and regulations.  HIDTA supervisors were also 
in non-compliance because they failed to regulate these actions. It was a vicious cycle 
that was uninterrupted with complacency.42 
Prior to 9/11, it was the responsibility of the US Customs agent in charge to 
regulate information sharing and ensure that the ISC was operating according to the 
mandate prescribed by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).  According 
to interviews of HIDTA participants, this formal regulation was not occurring.  Although 
a formal information-sharing policy was in place, day-to-day operations and practices did 
not adhere to this policy.43 State and local agencies felt that only the interests of the 
federal agencies were being catered to.  This perception was, one, created because the 
federal agencies were not sharing valuable or relevant information and two, because the 
fact US Customs was in charge, lent to the already scandalous premise that federal 
agencies were uncooperative and unwilling to share information.  In response, state and 
local operators banded together and virtually excommunicated themselves from federal 
agents.  As a result, the inconsistent application of policy and the cultural clash created a 
chasm that could not be bridged.     
Within the organizational struggle was a separate and equally damaging struggle 
occurring within the ISC.  Staffing levels were at an all time low, 6 analysts, to support 
over 10 HIDTA initiatives.44  Existing analysts were disgruntled and in need of reprieve.  
Even though a large amount of information activity was not occurring within the ISC, the 
volume of work exceeded the amount of labor that six analysts could efficiently provide.  
This in turn created a weak product, back logged requests for information, and unpleasant 
environment in which to operate.  According to one HIDTA supervisor, the understaffed 
and unhappy analysts support from the ISC was so poor that HIDTA undercover agents 
discarded the formal information channels – that is, ISC inquiries -- for less formal, word 
of  mouth,  means  of   gathering  and   exchanging   information.45   Unfortunately,   the  
                                                 
42  Interview.  Un-named New Mexico HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
43  Ibid. 
44 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  14 September 2004. 
45 Interview.  Un-named New Mexico HIDTA supervisor.  23 August 2004. 
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ambivalent circumstances created by management forced the HIDTA body to collectively 
circumvent the formal channels of information exchange, which in turn marginalized the 
ISC and diminished its net worth.   
The bottom line is that management created no incentive to share information and 
the result was division among agencies and virtually no information sharing.  According 
to HIDTA operating procedures, when initiatives fail to share information they are 
subjecting themselves to budgetary sanctions.  HIDTA supervisors can also administer 
verbal or written reprimands to those who do not engage in information exchange or 
coordinate operations through the HIDTA ISC.  Finally, personnel evaluations are tied 
directly to information exchange and ISC utilization.  With such policies in place, 
mechanisms existed to regulate information exchange.  Still, HIDTA management failed 
to impose sanctions or adverse personnel actions against those non-compliant with 
established regulation.  Management perpetuated this problematic environment and as a 
result the system operated as a “lame duck”.  
The rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures were not enforced and 
at times applied ambiguously.  As a result, the formal regulations that were in place for 
information sharing were disregarded and further lent to the faulty structure within the 
New Mexico HIDTA.   Because initiatives were not working together, and because the 
ISC was ineffective, an economy of force or synergy between agencies could not be 
cultivated.  As a result, several agencies continued to duplicate investigative efforts when 
the information was already in the hands of another agencies co-located within the 
HIDTA ISC.46  This inefficient operation was rarely regulated and because it went 
unchecked it became widespread and pervasive and further lead to the great divide 
between agencies.      
E. CONCLUSION 
The HIDTA ISC was designed to be the centerpiece of all HIDTA operations – to 
foster interagency cooperation, interagency coordination, and bolster information 
exchange and intelligence sharing.    However, in the pre 9/11 environment the HIDTA 
ISC was marginalized through autonomous operation, cultural differences, jurisdictional 
battles, and weak management at all levels.  Standards were not being enforced, sanctions                                                  
46 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  14 September 2004. 
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were not being imposed, and personnel actions were not being administered.  Individual 
actors turned inward and it appears as if management turned a blind eye.  Management 
failed to ensure that the HIDTA ISC was the centerpiece of information operations, in 
turn counter productive information sharing procedures literally destroyed the ISC. The 
following chapter examines how ISC operations have improved in the post 9/11 era of 
intelligence reconstruction.  Once again the examination will focus on actors interests and 
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III. OPERATION OF THE ISC POST 9/11 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will evaluate the extent to which the New Mexico HIDTA 
investigative support center has fulfilled its information and intelligence sharing 
responsibilities post 9/11.  It will also examine the factors that have shaped its ability to 
do so.  First, the changes that occurred within the HIDTA ISC in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 will be examined.  Next, an examination of ISC operations, post 9/11, will 
address the question, “Have operations of the ISC proven to be successful”?   And 
finally, a look at the future of ISC operations will be brought to light.  Focus will be 
placed on the ISC’s evolution into a multi-crime intelligence fusion center.  The primary 
focus, throughout, will be on actor’s interests and institutional processes.  Post 9/11, the 
majority of actor’s began to share information at a greater rate due to the fact of greater 
enforcement of the organizational rules, regulations, and policies.  As a result, 
interoperability and connectivity between HIDTA initiatives and the law enforcement 
community improved greatly.   
B. CHANGES IN INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AFTER 9/11 
Another very important change that occurred post 9/11, was an entire 
administration change and restructuring of who had control of the HIDTA ISC.  US 
Customs abdicated under intense scrutiny, a new director and deputy director were hired, 
New Mexico State Police were designated as co-managers of the facility (check and 
balance on Federal Agencies), and ONDCP was monitoring HIDTA activity very 
intently.  These changes were intended to send a clear message to the HIDTA initiatives 
that individual interests shall conform to established information sharing guidelines.  The 
HIDTA began reshaping and molding the dilapidated system and reinvigorating the 
antiquated mentality that the individual actors possessed.  The immediate aftermath of 
9/11 signaled a new way of doing business.   
The standard has changed for the New Mexico HIDTA ISC.  Post 9/11, the 
HIDTA and the ISC are operating in a highly regulated environment.  Procedural changes 
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 now strictly govern information sharing policy.  There 
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are legitimate measures in place that ensure information exchange and intelligence 
sharing are evaluated based upon initiative outcomes/results.    
Performance monitoring is now an integral part of the HIDTA.  The system of 
performance monitoring places greater emphasis on the leadership to ensure that 
initiative outcomes are meeting their prescribed goals.  Leadership is being held 
accountable by the national HIDTA administration as well as ONDCP.  To ensure that 
the system is running as designed, ONDCP will provide additional oversight of the 
HIDTA programs through internal and external reviews of individual HIDTA efforts.47 
According to Mr. Terry Azbill, Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Director, “the 
outcomes of each HIDTA initiative, to include the ISC, will be the evaluation criteria that 
determines success and failure of HIDTA nationwide.  This evaluation criterion will then 
cascade down and similarly determine the strengths and weaknesses of initiative 
information sharing.48   
At the beginning of each fiscal year, all HIDTA initiatives submit goals and 
objectives that they intend to accomplish throughout the year.  To ensure these goals and 
objectives are either being met or exceeded, HIDTA supervision requires monthly, 
quarterly, and yearly status reports.  These reports display outcomes that occur 
throughout the year.  Below is a New Mexico HIDTA annual information sharing goal 
statement for FY 2002 and the corresponding annual output conclusion report for the 
same fiscal year. These reports provide substantive and quantitative information that can 
easily be compared to ensure the goals established at the beginning of the fiscal year are 
being accomplished by years end.  Moreover, these information-sharing goals relate 
directly to the accomplishment and adherence of the nine core performance measures 
described in Chapter two. 
                                                 
47 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  Design for a HIDTA/OCDETF Performance Monitoring 
and Management System. Technical Report.  January 2003. p. 17. 
48 Interview.  Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Director.  Mr. Terry Azbill.  16 August 2004. 
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• Expected Output:  Purchase and install a new working database to 
improve the analytical capability of the New Mexico ISC.  Populate this 
database with data from the old system. 
 
• Actual Output:  The ORION database has been developed.  Beta testing 
has been conducted. 
 
Table 7. Information Sharing Goals and Outputs for New Mexico HIDTA ISC (FY02)49 
  
• Expected Output:  Connect to the Rocky Mountain Information Network 
(RMIN). 
 
• Actual Output: All analysts at the New Mexico ISC have accounts and 
share connectivity with the RMIN through the Rissgate information 
sharing project.  
 




• Expected Output:  Based on investigative and seizure reports received 
from initiatives and with the approval of the originating agency, forward at 
least 30 intelligence letters to the other HIDTA ISC’s, notifying them of 
drug activity in New Mexico by residents of their state or region. 
 
• Actual Output:  40 such dissemination letters were sent to other ISC’s.  33 
such letters were disseminated to individual Task Forces.  
 




• Expected Output: Publish two (2) trend and pattern reports and ten (10) 
Officer Safety Bulletins. 
  
• Actual Output: 12 monthly newsletters containing this information were 
published and distributed to HIDTA initiatives.    
 
Table 10. Information Sharing Goals and Outputs for New Mexico HIDTA ISC (FY02)52                                                  
49 HIDTA Inter-Office Correspondence. Southwest Border HIDTA- New Mexico.  FY 2004. p. 4. 
50 Ibid. 5. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. 
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These report cards are a tool for greater oversight.  Throughout the year HIDTA 
leadership can now compare where an initiative is relative to fulfilling its information 
sharing goals.  By maintaining vigilant oversight of each program, HIDTA leadership can 
direct or redirect resources, personnel, and ISC products or services to ensure efficiency 
in the overall operation.  Key leadership involvement has proven to be a vast 
improvement, post 9/11, not only for oversight and day-to-day management, but also for 
the facilitation of information sharing within the HIDTA initiatives.  
The information sharing goals for FY 2003 and FY 2004 were even greater and 
further expanded the use of connectivity between HIDTA ISC’s.  The goals were 
available but the outputs have not been disclosed.  The following tables will illustrate 
how information-sharing goals continually increase at the beginning of each fiscal year.   
  
  
• Expected Output: Connect to two (2) additional databases 
  
• Expected Output: Respond to four hundred (400) or more one-time 
Requests for Information (R.F.I.) 
 
• Expected Output:  Conduct post-seizure/link analysis of three hundred 
sixty-five (365) drug seizures, by conducting three thousand (3000) or 
more database checks and analyzing the results 
 
• Expected Output: Forward one hundred twenty (120) or more 
dissemination letters or emails to other HIDTAs, notifying them of drug 
trafficking activity in New Mexico involving persons or Vehicles from their 
area.  
 
• Expected Output:  Create ten (10) newsletters and disseminate copies of 




Table 11. Expected Outputs for the New Mexico HIDTA ISC (FY 2003)53 
 
                                                 
  




• Expected Output: Prepare profiles of 12 Drug Trafficking Organizations 
 
• Expected Output: Identify 36 or more new leads that should be 
investigated by New Mexico or other HIDTA initiatives. 
 
• Expected Output:  Forward 130 or more dissemination letters or e-mails 
to other HIDTA’s, notifying them of drug trafficking activity in New Mexico 
involving persons or vehicles from their area. 
 
• Expected Output:  Obtain 200 or more digital photographs of drug 
concealment techniques and/or other photographs related to drug 
trafficking in New Mexico and distribute them to New Mexico HIDTA 
initiatives and other HIDTA ISC’s.  
 
 
Table 12. Expected Outputs for the New Mexico HIDTA ISC (FY 2004)54 
 
The expected and actual outputs are not all encompassing.  The HIDTA ISC has 
several more goals and outputs concerning information sharing.  What is important and 
must be stressed, is the fact that the HIDTA is now holding individual actors responsible 
for production and dissemination of information, key leaders are now actively involved in 
the ISC process, the ISC is being utilized at a greater rate, and synergy is being 
accomplished between New Mexico initiatives and between HIDTA ISC’s nationwide.     
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 has had a dramatic effect on the institutional 
processes within the HIDTA system.  Because of the rigid reporting guidelines, 
individual actors are sharing information at a markedly greater rate.  Much of the credit 
has been given to the implementation of the New Mexico HIDTA Policy and Procedures 
Intelligence Sharing Plan.  These policies were in the formulation stages after 9/11 and 
implemented in October of 2003.  Due to the sensitive nature of the policies, HIDTA 
leadership requested, that detailed information not be cited.  In spite of the censored 
information, research is able to report that these detailed policies have greatly inspired 
actors within the HIDTA to share information with one another through the ISC.         
This plan influenced many of the HIDTA organizations to alter their unproductive 
behaviors and change their attitudes toward information sharing. The HIDTA intelligence 
                                                 
54Ibid. p. 7.  
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plan now creates incentives for commingling initiatives to share information.  According 
to SGT Scott Weaver of the New Mexico HIDTA, “Interagency coordination and 
information exchange are rewarded with monetary incentives, such as salary 
reimbursement or equipment upgrades, asset sharing in the form of seized vehicles or 
money, and travel benefits to track and locate career criminal enterprise operations”.55  
SGT Weaver also stated that the “HIDTA provides incentives for small players, such as 
rural county departments.  Now smaller agencies have the ability to utilize the benefits of 
greater information sharing systems, greater numbers of personnel, and the benefits of 
technology that are difficult to find in rural area departments.”56  Smaller departments 
had similar opportunities, pre 9/11, but the divisive environment frustrated their ability to 
reap many of the rewards from HIDTA participation.   
Many of the competing cultures, ideologies, and jurisdictional conflicts have been 
tempered by the intervention of key actor’s within the HIDTA administration.  Several of 
these information-sharing hurdles have been negotiated mainly because leadership is 
effectively enforcing rules, regulations, and standards.   
The interests of individual agents and agencies have not changed since 9/11, but 
information sharing has increased markedly.  This suggests that changes in organizational 
rules, norms, and interests have been crucial in determining whether information sharing 
takes place.  Several interviews have provided concrete evidence that incentives for 
information sharing are based on stern rules, rigid guidelines, and direct guidance.  In an 
interview with the New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director, it was stated that, “Compliance 
with information sharing is a mandatory.  Those who share information are adhering to 
the HIDTA guidance.  Those who do not share information are subject to funding 
sanctions or the elimination of funding altogether”.57  
HIDTA leadership has not only threatened sanctions but they have actually 
imposed sanctions on those not sharing information.  The Ruidoso initiative was 
recognized as not sharing information.  It was warned but failed to comply with HIDTA 
guidance.  As a result, the non-compliant initiative had all of its funding sanctioned by 
                                                 
55 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Task Force Supervisor.  SGT Scott Weaver.  14 July 2004. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Mr. Ernesto Ortiz.  16 August 2004. 
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the HIDTA Executive Board.  This punitive action sent a clear message to all other 
HIDTA initiatives.  Information exchange is paramount and derelict initiatives will have 
to contend with the consequences.  The uncompromised standard that all must follow is, 
ALL initiatives MUST report ALL activity to the HIDTA ISC, there are absolutely no 
exceptions.  Failure to do so could result in total or partial loss of funding.  In the case of 
the Ruidoso initiative they lost all funding for the remainder of the fiscal year.  They 
must petition the executive board to receive funding for next fiscal year.  Tying 
budgetary operating procedures to information sharing is a type of classical conditioning 
that ensures the desired end state is accomplished through fear of sanction.   
Another means to ensure that information exchange is occurring is through a 
structured reporting system.  First, supervisors monitor their subordinates.  Second, 
commanders monitor their supervisors. Finally, Directors monitor their commanders.  
This rigid chain of command creates redundancy in the information exchange process.  
By actively engaging the HIDTA leadership in information management, it makes 
circumvention of the ISC virtually impossible.  Transparency combined with several 
layers of visibility ensures that management is read in at every level.  In the post 9/11 
environment this is a very necessary step to ensure initiatives do not revert to the faulty 
mindset that plagued information exchange in the 1990’s. 
Supervision also requires that monthly, quarterly, and yearly reports be submitted 
for review.58  One way these reports track information sharing is by comparing the 
quantitative number of requests for information against the exact number of cases input 
into the ISC intelligence database.  The numbers should match exactly.  Supervisors can 
also query the ISC data base, at any time, to verify that the number of open cases are 
being queried by HIDTA initiatives.  Once again the numbers should match exactly.  This 
ensures the ISC is being utilized, data base infrastructure is being utilized, and initiatives 
are actively exchanging information with one another.  If they do not, “then the 
appropriate initiative is tracked down and given either a verbal or written reprimand.  
Budgetary sanctions are the final means of dealing with those who do not share 
information”.59  Because leadership is taking such an active role in information sharing 
                                                 
58 Interview.  Southwest Border HIDTA Executive Director.  Mr. Terry Azbill.  16 August 2004. 
59 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Mr. Ernesto Ortiz.  16 August 2004. 
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operations, the ISC has been stimulated and is now operating as a robust and busy center 
for information exchange and intelligence sharing.  
 Yet, another very important step leadership took to improve the capabilities of 
the ISC was to increase analytical staffing.  Analytical support was increased by hiring 4 
new analysts into the HIDTA ISC.   Currently, the New Mexico ISC is staffed with 15 
full-time, co-located personnel, of whom 10 are full time analysts and 2 are part time 
analysts from different agencies, and the remaining 5 are command or support staff.60  
Refer to Table 13 for a break down of full time co-located personnel. 
Number of Personnel Agency Position 
10 New Mexico Department of 
Public Safety 
1 DPS Tactical Director 
1 Coordinator 
2 Agents/Analysts 
1 Administrative Secretary 
4 Analysts 
1 Data Entry Clerk 
2   Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (F.B.I.) 
1 Strategic Director, 1 
Analyst 
1  Drug Enforcement 
Administration (D.E.A.) 
1 Analyst 
1 New Mexico National 
Guard 
1 Analyst 
1 Town of Tatum 1 Analyst 
Table 13. Full Time Co-Located HIDTA ISC Personnel61 
 
                                                 
60 HIDTA Inter-Office Correspondence. Southwest Border HIDTA- New Mexico.  FY 2004. p. 3-4. 
61 Ibid.   
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The New Mexico ISC has two part-time, co-located personnel.  Refer to Table 14 
for a breakdown of part time co-located personnel. 
Number of Personnel Agency Position 
1 U.S. Customs Service 1 Analyst 
1 New Mexico Adult 
Probation and Parole 
Department of Corrections 
1 Analyst 
 
Table 14. Part Time Co-Located HIDTA ISC Personnel62 
 
This is a moderate improvement; still it is a move in the correct direction.  By 
increasing staffing levels leadership has increased the ability of the ISC to analyze and 
process information to HIDTA initiatives.  The additional analysts have also absorbed 
some of the additional duties and work loads that the overburdened analysts were 
experiencing pre 9/11.  The National Guard analyst works data entry, the D.E.A. analyst 
provides strategic analysis to all initiatives, and state and local analysts work requests for 
information and disseminate alert information at the tactical level.  Leadership has made 
visible effort to improve quality of life issues and balance within the ISC.  
Table 13 also illustrates the change in the hierarchical structure of the HIDTA 
ISC.  Pre 9/11 the ISC was managed by a single federal agency (Customs).  As a result of 
the restructuring process, New Mexico HIDTA leadership decided that a system of 
checks and balances must be incorporated into the institution in order to facilitate 
information sharing at all levels.  As a result, the federal agencies are now sharing the 
operational responsibilities with the New Mexico State Police.  The operational process is 
no longer dominated by a single agency or singular agenda.  Now, a strategic director, 
F.B.I., and a tactical director, New Mexico State Police, manage operations and provide a 
balance within the institutional setting.63  The needs and perspectives of both federal and 
state and local agencies are represented at the management level, contributing to both the 
reality and the perception of equitable information sharing practices. 
                                                 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  p. 1. 
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Finally, data base connectivity has improved exponentially post 9/11.  New 
Mexico leadership recognized that isolation was not helping their information sharing 
cause.  As a result, HIDTA leadership has markedly increased the ISC connectivity to 
other information sharing nodes within the HIDTA community and with other pertinent 
law enforcement agencies.  Table 15 has a break down of each database to which the 
HIDTA ISC is now connected. 
  
Table 15. Database Nodes New Mexico HIDTA is Currently Connected To 
Treasury Enforcement Communication System  
(TECS) 
National Criminal Information Center  
(NCIC) 
The Interstate Identification Index (III) 
National Law Enforcement Teletype System 
 (NLETS) 
INS Central Index System  
(CIS) 
Commercial Drivers License Information System  
(CDLIS and SAFER) 
DEA Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS) 
New Mexico Criminal Justice Information System  
(CJIS) 
FBI Field Office Information Management System 
 (FOIMS) 




Narcotics Information Network Joint Agency System  
(NINJAS) 
Rocky Mountain Info Network  
(RMIN) 
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By expanding database connectivity the New Mexico ISC has increased its ability 
to share and sample information with agencies nationwide.  This is a very necessary 
institutional change, because now the institutional infrastructure is in place for initiatives 
and analysts to utilize in the decision making process.  Before, the New Mexico ISC was 
isolated within the confines of its own building.  
 Database connectivity and communications interoperability have also proven to 
be beneficial to the ISCs information sharing process.  Post 9/11 the HIDTA ISC 
connected to 14 additional databases and their subsystems (Table 15).  In addition to 
these external databases the HIDTA ISC has also established an internal database, called 
“Orion,” for initiatives to utilize.  It is an internal node that allows New Mexico 
initiatives, supervisors, and analysts to enter information, sample information, and view 
sortable information based on any variant of screening criteria.  Orion can help track 
trends among initiatives and alert analysts of links between drug trafficking organizations 
or requested criminal elements.  Orion is relatively new but it is said to have added the 
fundamental base for connectivity between initiatives.         
Institutional processes play a major role in the internal enforcement of New 
Mexico HIDTA information and intelligence sharing.  Local standard operating 
procedures in combination with ONDCP guidance, indeed, limit options for action and do 
channel institutional behavior along the established path of information exchange and 
intelligence sharing.  The institutional processes paradigm illustrates that rules, standard 
operating procedures, and common interests shape behavior for a specific outcome.  
C. HAVE OPERATIONS OF THE ISC POST 9/11 PROVEN TO BE 
SUCCESSFUL? 
While conducting interviews it became obvious that the New Mexico HIDTA 
ISC, is working in concert with one another to further the goals of information sharing 
within and among law enforcement agencies.   For example, HIDTA enforcement 
personnel, in concert with the ISC, are currently working to disrupt and dismantle a 
cocaine trafficking organization believed to have links to Michoacan, Mexico. This 
organization was previously targeted by the Regional Interagency Drug Task Force, 
which resulted in disruption of the sale and distribution of cocaine and directly affected 
the purity level of the cocaine sold by this organization. The New Mexico ISC provided 
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analytical assistance on this investigation in order to elevate it to an Organized Crime and 
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) status.64   OCDETF and HIDTAs share 
information on related cases.  OCDETF has much greater ability to deal with DTOs 
because they are the only criminal justice task force program with national reach that 
combines the talent of experienced federal agents and prosecutors.   Coordination 
between the two agencies combines the strengths of both state and local enforcement 
activity with that of the Federal system.  The synergy created acts as a force multiplier to 
enhance enforcement measures and adjudication efforts within the criminal justice 
system.  As illustrated, the enforcement body and intelligence body of the HIDTA have 
common interests (narcotic enforcement), they have rationalized their actions into a 
collective action (disrupting a major drug trafficking organization), and have chosen a 
common end state for their actions (elevate to OCEDTF status) for further investigation 
and follow on adjudication.  
HIDTA intelligence support programs are moving fast toward efficient and 
effective coordination of activities.  The ISC is now operating according to its mandated, 
which states, “HIDTA initiatives must coordinate their activities with the intelligence 
subsystem.”65  As stated by ONDCP guidance,  “Identification of all criminal targets 
should be coordinated through the Intelligence Subsystem to facilitate cross-case 
analysis, prevent duplication, and ensure the Executive Board, where appropriate, has 
sufficient information to establish priorities.”66  As the centerpiece of HIDTA operations, 
the ISC is committed to establishing the creation of an intelligence infrastructure that can 
facilitate information sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 
Initiatives are now reporting their activity to the ISC 100 percent of the time.  Use of 
database inquiries has increased by more than an estimated 40 percent in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11. 67  As a result, there has been a noticeable increase in information 
sharing HIDTA wide.  According to Lt. Avilucea, the HIDTA and the ISC must continue 
                                                 
64 Email excerpt from a New Mexico HIDTA quarterly report.   
65 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.  Section IX of the 
HIDTA Program Policy & Budget Guidance Manual. 
66 HIDTA Program Policy and Budget Guidance.  ONDCP/OSLA/HIDTA .  27 September 2001. 
Section IX. P. 29. 
67 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  16 September 2004. 
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to improve but post 9/11 the information-sharing environment has markedly increased.68        
The HIDTA ISC is now the true focal point for the sharing of intelligence among law 
enforcement agencies.   
The intelligence apparatus, post 9/11, is now analyzing information, transforming 
it into actionable intelligence, and sharing it with law enforcement agencies nationwide.  
The ISC is now collecting information from several sources.  The primary source of 
information is the incident report.  HIDTA initiatives furnish the ISC with copies of 
reports written by task force agents.  Another means of gathering information is open 
source data.  ISC intelligence analysts review newspapers and online resources for 
current event information and criminal activity indicators that may jeopardize or threaten 
an operation or the public.  Finally, the ISC is receiving information from every HIDTA 
initiative.  This information is analyzed for possible links, trends, or similarities that can 
be reported back to the initiatives.  If links do exist between criminal enterprises and 
initiative investigations, then the information is shared and the benefit is a coordinated 
effort in handling the case.     
Sharing the product is done in several different ways.  “The HIDTA ISC produces 
a bi-monthly newsletter and a yearly threat assessment that has the latest criminal trend 
data and criminal activity profiles.”69   This information is disseminated to all HIDTA 
participating agencies.  This type of information sharing is intended to provide more of 
the strategic or investigative picture to HIDTA personnel.  At the tactical level, 
information sharing occurs with either a direct request from the action agency or in the 
form of alerts.  Direct requests are made in the form of requests for information (RFIs).  
Alerts, on the other hand, are issued when, “trends lead an analyst to believe that officer 
safety is in jeopardy, a certain sector of the community is being targeted by criminal 
activity, or new tactics/methods are being utilized to circumvent the rule of law.”70 
Finally, ISC trend analysis assists operators in targeting organizations by 
assessing their transportation corridors, transportation methods, and exposing critical 
vulnerabilities.  As a result, analysts are able to assist in the decision making process by 
                                                 
68 Interview. Director of HIDTA ISC Tactical Intelligence.  Lt. Robert Avilucea.  25 August 2004. 
69 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA FBI Supervisor.  Steve Hale.  20 April 2004. 
70 Interview.  New Mexico HIDTA Deputy Director.  Ernesto Ortiz.  15 December 2003. 
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providing assessments and suggesting options and alternatives for law enforcement 
operations.  For example, an analyst will make an inquiry into a database.  With the 
necessary screening criteria (i.e. name, license plate, address), the database is able to 
produce filtered information desired by the intelligence user.  Information such as, 
frequently visited establishments, the times these establishments were visited, and what 
vehicles have been reported in the area.  “This process in the past has uncovered 
clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, human and narcotic smuggling routes along 
the southwest border, and even assisted in determining the location of countless 
outstanding fugitives.”71  
Each of the capabilities discussed are what make the HIDTA ISC the 
“centerpiece” of the operation.  Whether providing event deconfliction at the local street 
officer level, providing useable intelligence to state and county officers on drug links 
between counties, or deciphering trend data for Federal Agents working large scale 
criminal enterprises (Consolidated Priority Organization Targets), the HIDTA ISC is 
providing actionable intelligence at all levels.  These ISC activities are a vast 
improvement compared to the inefficient and problematic environment they operated in 
pre 9/11. 
D. NEW MISSION POST 9/11: MULTI-CRIME FUSION CENTER 
In the post 9/11 era, HIDTA will continue to function according to its 
fundamental mission to, “Improve the ability of High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas to 
counter drug trafficking”.72  However, the HIDTA has expanded its intelligence focus 
from solely narcotic to multi-crime intelligence analysis and dissemination.  This action 
was solidified in a HIDTA article “A Foundation for Information Sharing” written by the 
National HIDTA Director, Kurt F. Schmid.  This article states, “While HIDTA is a 
counter drug program, the HIDTA intelligence centers operate in a general criminal 
intelligence environment, thus leveraging ALL criminal intelligence information for the 
Program’s primary mission.”73  What was not mentioned and is of great importance is 
the fact that information collected from within the HIDTA Intelligence Support Center 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 HIDTA Program Policy and Budget Guidance.  ONDCP/OSLA/HIDTA .  27 September 2001. 
Section IX. P. 26 
73 Office of National Drug Control Policy.  HIDTA: A Foundation for Information Sharing.  p. 1. 
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will also be furnished to other agencies like the IRS, ATF, and US Marshalls to further 
execute their individual agency missions.74   This coordinated movement will increase 
law enforcement productivity through information exchange and intelligence sharing. 
As a result of this change in focus, HIDTA ISCs are migrating toward the concept 
of “intelligence fusion centers”.  HIDTA ISCs will actively share case information on 
money laundering, terrorism, and narcotic traffic.  This national initiative is the next 
wave in the multi-agency information sharing process.  Now, information that does not 
have an absolute drug nexus will be reviewed by the ISC and disseminated to the 
appropriate action agency.  Moreover, information and intelligence will be passed to 
EPIC and the Department of Homeland Security after the information has been fused.75  
The fusion process consists of receiving, analyzing, and associating all leads.  This newly 
fused information will then be vetted by EPIC or the DHS federal intelligence 
clearinghouse and disseminated as appropriate.  This new role of “intelligence fusion” is 
still in the production phases.  Currently, data base infrastructure is being developed to 
support information transfer and secure data base sampling.  By broadening the scope of 
the HIDTA ISC duties, HIDTA leadership is continuing to transform the ISC into a high 
yield organization and secure its place not only on the southwest border but throughout 
the nation as well. 
Intelligence networks nationwide, realize that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 
occurred because of flaws within the intelligence apparatus.  As a result, the HIDTA ISC 
is adapting to the new multi-faceted threat that terrorist networks present.  HIDTA ISCs 
will help identify strategic money laundering schemes that fund terror, identify 
smuggling rings that smuggle narcotics and people across the U.S. borders, and also 
provide information on local fronts that support money laundering and harbor fugitives.  
The threat has changed and so have the HIDTA ISC techniques, tactics, and procedures. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The framework has been laid for the HIDTA structure to become a formidable 
intelligence apparatus. Integration of law enforcement agents at all levels into the 
Investigative Support Centers, disseminating intelligence on crimes other than narcotics, 
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and creating a robust intelligence network innervated with procedures that foster 
information exchange are the bare essentials that will make the HIDTA ISC a formidable 
intelligence apparatus. The structure is in place and the tools are available, now more 
than ever, the HIDTA intelligence apparatus is noteworthy and viable to the intelligence 
consumer.  The HIDTA ISC will allow the intelligence consumer to benefit from 
improved local, state, and Federal relationships.  Once again the structure is in place and 
the tools are available to ensure the HIDTA ISC is a viable intelligence apparatus for 
both current and future intelligence operations.   
Intelligence fusion is an overwhelming move in the right direction for the New 
Mexico HIDTA.  It shows that the New Mexico HIDTA system is maturing and growing 
out of the behaviors that once marginalized it across the board.  By expanding data base 
connectivity to allow analysts to send and query information from information nodes 
within EPIC and DHS, is a sure sign of movement in the correct direction.  As the New 
Mexico HIDTA intelligence apparatus continues to be the focus of initiative operations,  
agencies can feel comfortable knowing that information is being analyzed, deconflicted, 
and shared among and between initiatives.       
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THE FINDINGS 
Findings indicate that, pre 9/11, the New Mexico HIDTA ISC was marginalized 
and ineffective.  Interagency conflicts, spurred by conflicting ideas and ideologies, 
jurisdictional battles, and blatant disregard to enforce and play by the rules were the 
Achilles heel that hampered information sharing.  This problematic environment 
perpetuated a vicious cycle that virtually dismantled the ISCs intelligence sharing 
process.  Collection efforts were unilateral and information gained was hoarded and 
rarely shared.  Analysis of data proved to be fruitless because it was seldom being 
utilized as a viable resource to field agents.  One of the most debilitating factors, which 
stunted the progress of information sharing, was that information was not being 
disseminated through a common medium.  The entire intelligence process was flawed.   
A weak leadership cadre further exacerbated the  problems of the ISC.  Pre 9/11, 
HIDTA leadership appeared to be derelict on duty.  Organizational policies, rules, 
regulation, and standard operating procedures were being overlooked and infrequently 
enforced.  HIDTA leaders presented no tangible incentives, either positive or negative, to 
facilitate healthy information sharing between HIDTA initiatives.  As a result, agencies 
turned inward and away from one another causing a halt to any horizontal 
communication.  In effect, there were several agencies working in the same building, yet 
none were communicating with one another.  National and local policy was in place to 
prevent such an occurrence from happening, but leaders at all levels failed to regulate the 
widespread autonomous action.  The breakdown of the HIDTA ISC occurred at all levels 
for several reasons, but the lack of leadership intervention created the faulty mindset of 
the individual actors and severely curtailed the legitimate processes of the institution.  
The tragic events of 9/11 were the catalysts that caused the New Mexico HIDTA 
ISC to change.  The immediate aftermath of 9/11 exposed several inadequacies within the 
national intelligence framework.  Information exchange and intelligence sharing were 
two areas of serious concern.  As a result of the intense scrutiny, many organizations, to 
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include the New Mexico HIDTA, began to reevaluate their process of information 
exchange and intelligence sharing.   
The New Mexico HIDTA began to reconstruct its operations from the top down.  
Post 9/11 reconstruction has yielded new leadership, stricter adherence to regulations, 
mandatory information sharing through the ISC, and conditions that create a less divisive 
and more cooperative environment in which to work.  HIDTA leadership now plays a 
greater role in the oversight of HIDTA initiatives. Leaders ensure, initiatives are no 
longer given the leeway to act autonomously, they ensure federal agencies no longer 
dominate the system, and they ensure greater transparency in operations and information 
flow.  HIDTA cadre now enforces information-sharing policy and ensures that the 
outcomes are reflected in personnel evaluations, monetary incentives, and monetary 
sanctions.  Moreover, all activity is now regulated through the ISC.  The ISC acts as the 
hub for the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information to HIDTA participants.  
According to the National HIDTA Director, Kurt Schmid,  
The HIDTA Program is postured to establish its intelligence system as its 
legacy:  a busy, robust, fully integrated, national criminal intelligence 
system “one-stop shop” for officers who value interdependence, 
integrating intelligence products with their operations. 76  
In the post 9/11 environment, this is indeed the case.  The New Mexico HIDTA 
ISC is now the centerpiece of the overall organization.  Even more, the HIDTA is now 
sharing information on terrorism and money laundering to organizations like the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the El Paso Intelligence Center.  These cooperatives are indicators that 
the New Mexico HIDTA has emerged as a viable information and intelligence apparatus 
in the new era of information exchange and intelligence sharing. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Information exchange has established a foothold on the intelligence and law 
enforcement community.  Processing and disseminating information will be priority 
number one for years to come.  This increased emphasis on the intelligence arm of 
operations is placing a strain on the New Mexico HIDTA ISC.  Currently, the New 
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Mexico ISC is staffed with 17 personnel, compared with the Arizona ISC, which is 
staffed with over 200 personnel.77  Because of the proximity to the U.S./Mexican border, 
intelligence requirements have increased exponentially since 9/11.  Unfortunately, as the 
requirements have increased the staffing levels of the New Mexico HIDTA ISC have not.  
In order to better address the shear volume of information that must be processed and 
disseminated the New Mexico HIDTA ISC needs additional personnel.   
One possible solution is to import National Guard soldiers into the ISC as 
analysts.  National Guard soldiers not only possess the skill and ability, but they are 
highly adaptable and could be trained as analysts in a relatively short amount of time.  
Another added benefit to incorporating National Guard soldiers into the HIDTA ISC is 
that they all possess, at a minimum, a secret clearance.  If confidential information must 
be handled, then why not trust it to a soldier who already possesses a clearance from the 
Department of Defense?  If National Guard soldiers cannot assume the role of analyst, 
then the HIDTA ISC must begin granting clearances to those existing analysts.  In the 
end, to be effective personnel must have the appropriate clearances to get the job done.   
Personnel must also have the appropriate resources to get the job done.  Data base 
connectivity is paramount.  The HIDTA ISC must continue to develop and connect its 
data base infrastructure to information and intelligence nodes law enforcement wide.  As 
the ISC expands its technological infrastructure, it expands its capabilities to produce a 
viable product that the intelligence consumer can utilize. Interoperability between 
agencies is the staple of the new intelligence era.  The HIDTA ISC must possess the tools 
that guarantee it is connected, interoperable, and secure. 
Final recommendations stress that HIDTA management continue to maintain 
oversight of information exchange between agencies.  To prevent pre 9/11 activity, 
management must involve itself at every level to ensure institutional processes guide the 
interests of HIDTA players.  Individual actors must also make efforts to actively engage 
in the information sharing process.  Cultural and organizational clashes need to be dealt 
with aggressively in order to break down the barriers created by years of the “us vs. 
them” attitude.  Employees should receive organizational behavior classes so that they 
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may be aware of organizational cultural issues that could lead to faulty mindsets that 
affect information sharing. In the end, the New Mexico HIDTA ISC has progressed 
significantly compared to its pre 9/11 posture.  Progress is a good sign that actors 
interests and institutional processes are indeed being shaped to conform to the post 9/11 
information and intelligence reconstruction.    
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